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Abstract In recent past the concept of the ‘network’ or ‘network organization’ has
emerged as one of the most prominent concepts for thinking, understanding and
conceptualizing the coordination of ‘productive activities’. In the literature on
network organizations, ‘trust’ is commonly understood to be the main coordinating
mechanism of this organizational form. Highlighting the problematics involved in
this prime focus on trust, this study combines practice-based theory (Schatzki in
Social practices: a Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) and a Foucauldian understanding of
governing to contribute to a more differentiated understanding of the coordination
of everyday activities in network organizations. By focusing on how the ‘network
organization’ and its subjects are ‘produced’ in power-infused practices, this study
provides insights into the complexity of mechanisms involved in such organizations.
Empirically this is illustrated at the example of a consulting company which
describes itself—internally and externally—as ‘network organization’. Based on an
ethnographic participant observation and in-depth semi-structured interviews, the
analysis of the case questions the centrality of trust as coordinating mechanism and
provides deep insights into the constitution of this specific ‘network organization’.
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Castells (1996) argues that ‘networks are the fundamental stuff of which new
organizations are and will be made’ (p. 168). One may or may not agree with the
tremendous importance Castells ascribes to networks. However, networks do play a
major role in contemporary civil society and the economic system (see also e.g.
Powell 2001; Tilly 2001; Kornberger and Gudergan 2006). The body of research on
social networks has grown extensively in the last three decades (Kilduff and Brass
2010; Carpenter et al. 2012) and ‘network’ as a concept is used in many different
ways in diverse research contexts and disciplines. Within the social sciences,
‘networks’ have for example been approached as a context defining and shaping
strategic alliances (e.g. Gulati 1998) or economic action more generally (e.g.
Granovetter 1985; Lomi 1997). At the same time, networks have been approached
as personal resources that can be drawn on to see and realize certain opportunities
(e.g. Burt 1997), as potential sources of power (e.g. Krackhardt 1990) or as conduit-
like instruments granting access to resources such as knowledge (e.g. Borgatti and
Cross 2003). In this article, the term ‘network’ is used in the context of ‘network
organizations’. Following the literature on network organizations (and organiza-
tional networks), but keeping in mind that the term ‘network’ is first and foremost
an analytic convenience and ‘less a description of any particular form of
association’ (DiMaggio 2001a, p. 237), ‘network organization’ shall here be
understood as a specific organizational model distinguishable from other organi-
zational forms such as hierarchy/bureaucracy and market through its emphasis on
reciprocity and collaboration rather than authority or competition (e.g. Powell
1990).1 From the theoretical perspective of this paper, it is ultimately the particular
way of coordinating (productive) activities associated with ‘network organizations’
that is of interest, rather than the entities or properties that might or might not
deserve the label ‘network’, ‘organization’, or ‘network organization’ according to
any of the many definitions available. In this sense, the concept of network
organization is also somewhat independent from the theoretical division often
drawn between inter- and intra-organizational networks. As ‘new logic of
organizing’ (Powell 2001, p. 35) that impacts how ‘work is organized, structured,
and governed’ (ibid), it may not only transcend the theoretical borders commonly
drawn around organizations. This ‘new’ logic of organizing may, as will be argued,
actually call the suitability of distinctions such as employee/organization and intra-/
interorganizational into question.
In the literature on network organizations (and organizational networks),
networks are usually the explanandum (see also Carpenter et al. 2012) and
conceptualized as the answer to certain demands, especially current environmental
demands (e.g. Miles and Snow 1992; Sydow and Windeler 1998; Starkey et al.
2000; Sydow 2003; see also Dijksterhuis et al. 1999), such as the often mentioned
need for greater flexibility. Thus, in contemporary management discourse ‘network
organizations’ are often advocated as the most efficient managerial solution for
1 These terms have been used in many different ways by several authors. There is no common definition
(see also Antivachis and Angelis 2015).
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coordinating productive activities (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). Commonly
assumed in such approaches is that networks consist of ‘actors who make contacts’
(Czarniawska 2004, p. 781). Thus, according to this perspective, actors come first,
i.e. ‘there first have to be actors before networks can come into being’ (Lindberg and
Czarniawska 2006, p. 294). This assumption is problematic, because it postulates
and ascribes priority to presumably pre-existing entities (individuals or organiza-
tions). Further, ‘trust’ defined as a ‘type of expectation that alleviates the fear that
one’s exchange partner will act opportunistically’ (Gambetta 1988, p. 217 cited in
Bradach and Eccles 1993, p. 282)2 is commonly seen as ‘control mechanism’
(Bradach and Eccles 1993) specific to and characteristic of the network form of
organization.
The concept of trust played a major role in the theoretical development of the
construct of the ‘network organization’ through contributing to possibilities of
differentiating this form from other organizational forms (bureaucracy and market).3
Coase’s (1937) work on ‘The Nature of the Firm’ is usually credited for initiating
the debate on the relationship between different organizational forms, i.e. markets
and, in Coase’s parlance, firms (bureaucracies/hierarchies) (see e.g. Bradach and
Eccles 1993; Powell 1990; DiMaggio 2001b). By pointing to the existence of other
mechanisms organizing transactions than price, namely, the ‘directions of an
entrepreneur’, Coase introduced what should later be termed the ‘dichotomous
view’ (Podolny and Page 1998) in which market and firm (bureaucracy) featured as
ideal types of organizing productive activities. Williamson’s (1975) transaction cost
economics developed this thought further and set the stage for the development of
the ‘continuum view’ (ibid) in which the existence of other forms of organization
than market and bureaucracy was acknowledged only as hybrids located on a
continuum between the two ideal types (see e.g. Powell 1990; Bradach and Eccles
1993; Podolny and Page 1998; DiMaggio 2001b; Provan and Kenis 2008;
Antivachis and Angelis 2015). Today, a large number of scholars (e.g. Ouchi
1980; Thompson 1993; Rhodes 1996; Podolny and Page 1998; Starkey et al. 2000;
DiMaggio 2001b; Baudry and Chassagnon 2012; Castells 2004; Halinen and
To¨rnroos 2005; Demil and Lecocq 2006; Cristofoli et al. 2014; Antivachis and
Angelis 2015) share an alternative perspective from which the network form of
organization is seen as an autonomous form of organization with its own logic
(Powell 1990).4 In this view, the ‘network logic’ and the ‘properties of the parts of
2 Trust has been defined in different ways highlighting different facets of the phenomenon. I follow
McEvily et al.’s (2003) suggestion to decide for one of the many definitions of trust and apply it
consistently throughout this paper.
3 Podolny and Page (1998) for example argued that the ‘more trusting ethics is one of the defining
elements of a network form of governance, and the network form of governance is therefore not reducible
to a hybridization of market and hierarchical forms, which, in contrast, are premised on a more adversial
posture’ (p. 61). In the same vein, McEvily et al. (2003) argue in their article on trust as organizing
principle: ‘Organizational forms are the outcome of the workings of dominant organizing principles and,
in theory, should have different characteristics depending on the underlying principle’.
4 Bradach and Eccles, however, state that this perspective, which, according to the authors ‘simply
add[s] a category to the market and hierarchy dichotomy’ (1993, p. 277), is as misleading as the
continuum view and argue instead for a shift away from ideal types (i.e. markets, bureaucracies/
hierarchies and networks) to plural forms. Their major critique is that both, the continuum view and the
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the system’ (i.e. the network organization) is characterized by the kinds of
interaction that take place among the parts of the system (Powell 1990, p. 301).
And, it is argued, because those kinds of interactions are reciprocal, preferential and
mutually supportive, they result in trust (ibid)—now commonly taken to be the
central coordination mechanism specific to and characteristic of ‘network
organizations’.5
Contrary to this assertion, this paper argues that the prime focus on trust is ill-
suited for understanding the coordination of everyday activities in network
organizations and calls for a reconsideration of this assumption in research on
network organizations.6 Whether trust is a substitute for or complements other
coordination mechanisms is an ongoing debate in the broader field of trust research
(Skinner et al. 2014). With its emphasis on the (presumed) economic benefits of
trust (in contrast to price or authority), the literature on network organizations tends
to share the ‘substitution perspective’ (see also Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007)
and usually approaches trust as the coordination mechanism in network organiza-
tions. However, empirical findings do not substantiate the substitution view (Costa
and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007; Skinner et al. 2014). Apart from that, trust as a single
concept is unlikely to offer adequate explanations of such multi-faceted and
complex configurations as (network) organizations (see also Grandori 1997)7—
ascribing an overly potent role to trust may even lead to a neglect of other important
governance mechanisms. Relatedly, such a focus on trust can contribute to a
disproportionately positive image of network organizations. Although there is an
increasing number of studies in the broader area of trust research that challenges
one-sided views on trust (Siebert et al. 2015), the ‘truism that trust is always, in and
of itself, something which is good and desirable’ (Skinner et al. 2014, p. 218) seems
still dominant—even more so in the literature on network organizations.8 This
bright picture of trust potentially veils less positive aspects about the coordination of
everyday activities in network organizations.
Footnote 4 continued
perspective that proposes a three-fold typology are based on the flawed premise that ideal types are
mutually exclusive. Certainly, Bradach and Eccles are right in pointing to the mixture of mechanisms
associated with organizational forms in praxis. Stating that empirically an ideal type cannot be observed
does, however, not make the concept of the network as an ideal type less useful.
5 Following Provan and Kenis (2008), some studies conceptualize trust as ‘structural property’ of
network organizations that provides the ‘basis for collaboration’ (p. 238) in such organizations. Though
these studies do not conceptualize trust explicitly as ‘control mechanism’ (Bradach and Eccles 1993),
they implicitly assume coordinative effects of trust in network organizations (according to these studies,
the ‘density’ of trust prevalent in a network determines the need for supplementary coordination
mechanisms).
6 The role of trust as coordination mechanism has also been critiqued in the literature on inter-
organizational networks (Grandori and Soda 1995) and adjacent streams of literature (e.g. Zenger et al.
2000; Davies 2012).
7 As also Grandori (1997) points out, networks (like firms and markets) employ a ‘wide range of
coordination mechanisms’ (p. 32) in praxis.
8 See for example the longitudinal study on ‘achieving optimal trust’ in inter-organizational relationships
by Stevens et al. (2015) for an interesting exception.
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For these reasons, this study does not follow other studies on network
organizations in assuming an exclusive or prime role of trust in the coordination
of everyday activities in ‘network organizations’. Grounded in an empirical case of
an organization which describes itself internally and externally as ‘network
organization’, this study instead seeks to further problematize the role ascribed to
trust and combines Schatzki’s (e.g. 2008) practice-based theory and a Foucauldian
understanding of governing9 to contribute to a more differentiated understanding of
the coordination of everyday activities in ‘network organizations’ in order to
enhance our understanding of the constitution of this way of organizing productive
activities. By focusing on how the ‘network organization’ and its subjects are
‘produced’ in power-infused practices, this study provides insights into the
complexity of mechanisms involved in such organizations. Drawing on Schatzki’s
(e.g. 2008) sophisticated conceptualization of practices as nexuses of doings and
sayings, organized by and linked through understandings, rules, and teleoaffective
structures,10 allows to provide a systematic exploration of the ‘integrative’ practices
prevalent in the empirical organization and to account for the role of ‘affectivities’
(emotions, or moods) in organizing practices—an important point often overlooked
by studies on governmentality. Additionally drawing on Weiskopf and Loacker’s
(2006) Foucault-inspired work on ‘technologies of modulation’ allows to trace and
depict the multiple ways in which the ‘appropriate individual’ (Alvesson and
Willmott 2002) is produced in the networked economy and organization. Thus, in
contrast to a ‘rationalist perspective’ on governance (Ezzamel and Reed 2008)
which ‘highlights calculated intent and efficiency maximization’ (p. 599) when
theorizing the coordination of productive activities, this study proceeds from what
has been termed a governance as ‘governmentality perspective’ (Ezzamel and Reed
2008), or an ‘analytics of government’ (Dean 2010) that is ‘concerned with the
specific conditions under which entities emerge, exist and change’ (p. 30). Such a
perspective highlights how any stabilized form (be it actor or organization) is a
contingent product of power-infused practices. The analysis thus brackets questions
of economic efficiency of organizational forms and focusses instead on the practices
producing ‘network organizations’.
2 The constitution of network organizations and their members:
the organization of social practices and technologies of modulation
2.1 The constitutive force of social practices
The emphasis on practices instead of individuals (or structures) allows studies based
on practice theories to readdress the constitution of phenomena such as organiza-
tions or individuals rather than granting such phenomena ontological primacy and
9 Schatzki (2008, pp. 83–87) also draws on the work of Foucault and Butler in his account of the
constitution of individuals through practices.
10 Structures relating to hierarchized ends, purposes, projects etc. and/or emotions, moods.
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treating them as given.11 Although ‘practices’, as for example ‘control and
coordination practices’ (Rometsch and Sydow 2006) have been referred to in the
literature on networks, practices have regularly been described merely on the
surface level in this stream of literature (e.g. Johnston and Lawrence 1993;
Gombault 2006). Though these studies are undoubtedly of theoretical value, merely
describing practices on a surface-level is not sufficient from perspectives adhering
to a practice-based ontology (Rasche and Chia 2009; Nicolini 2012) and represents a
rather ‘weak approach’ to practices (Nicolini 2012, p. 13). Despite the remarkable
diversity of practice-based approaches (Miettinen et al. 2009; Nicolini 2012), their
common emphasis on practices suggests ‘to get close’ (Rasche and Chia 2009),
because exploring some phenomenon from this perspective means exploring the
everyday doings and sayings which bring this phenomenon into being. Following
this ‘strong programme’ (Nicolini 2012, p. 13) of practice-based theories, I
understand practices as fundamental to the fabrication of the social and consider
social reality as ‘fundamentally made up of practices’ (Feldman and Orlikowski
2011, p. 1241). Seen from this perspective, social practices are productive of the
subjectivities and identities of actors in network organizations. It is through
participation in practices that actors become who they are (May 2001; Schatzki
2008).
2.2 The organization of social practices
I mainly draw on Schatzki’s well-developed approach to social practices. In
Schatzki’s work on social practices, ‘any practice opens a dense field of coexistence
embracing its participants’ (2008, p. 186) and thereby automatically establishes
orderings among these participants (ibid, p. 195). Thus, participants in a practice are
not equal, but rather ‘separated, hierarchized and distributed’ (ibid, p. 196).
Sociality or the hanging-togetherness (Zusammenhang) of social lives opened in a
practice is ‘essentially an interrelating of lives within practices’ (ibid, p. 180) and to
a large extent ‘organized around a range of subject positions’ (ibid, p. 198). Actions
of practices, i.e. doings and sayings pertaining to specific practices are organized by
understandings, rules and teleoaffective structures. The understanding of a practice
linking its respective actions consists of the ability or know how to carry out,
identify and prompt or respond to this specific practice (ibid, p. 91). For example,
the understanding of explaining prompts a local to explain (respond) the way to a
tourist asking (prompt) for directions to a place particularly difficult to find. The
actions he performs while explaining the way to the tourist are identifiable as such
by the tourist (ability to identify). While understandings mostly organize ‘dispersed
practices’ (practices widely used across different sectors of social life such as
explaining, examining, questioning), rules and teleoaffective structures usually link
integrative practices (‘the more complex practices found in and constitutive of
particular domains of life’ (ibid, p. 98)) as for example business practices. Rules are
11 Besides this potential, practice based theories enjoy a growing interest in organization studies and
other fields (Miettinen et al. 2009) for the possibilities these theories offer for rethinking and resolving
long-standing dualisms (e.g. actor/system, social/material, body/mind, theory/action) and for their
exploratory and explanatory potential (Nicolini 2012).
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explicit formulations such as principles, precepts, or instructions that people refer to
when carrying out a practice (ibid, p. 100). While rules governing behavior must be
explicit, teleoaffective structures do not have to be. Teleoaffective structures refer to
teleologies (hierarchized ends, purposes, projects, tasks etc.) and affectivities
(emotions, moods) expressed by the actions of a practice. While the teleoaffective
structure of some practices is rather concerned with teleology (e.g. the aim of
business practices to generate monetary value), other teleoaffective structures are
rather geared towards affectivities, e.g. rearing practices (ibid).
2.3 Technologies of modulation
Schatzki’s sophisticated account of the organization of practices allows a systematic
analysis of integrative practices and highlights their affective aspects. But how can
we understand the ways in which participants of nexuses of practices take on the
subject positions opened up there within? I will draw on the concept of
‘technologies of modulation’, i.e. technologies of responsibilisation, contractuali-
sation and employability12 (Weiskopf and Loacker 2006) to explore the multiple
ways in which the ‘appropriate individual’ (Alvesson and Willmott 2002) is
produced in the networked economy and organization. Basically, technologies of
modulation refer to the diverse ways in which subjects are constituted in power-
infused practices in the context of the ‘post-disciplinary regime of work’ associated
with the networked organization and society. One of the central insights highlighted
by this concept is that the mode of organizational subjectification has shifted in
post-disciplinary regimes of work (Weiskopf and Loacker 2006; Weiskopf and
Munro 2012). In contrast to ‘disciplinary modes of subjectification’ where subjects
could proceed in preset stages towards some more or less stable image as for
example some image of an ideal type worker, ‘post-disciplinary regimes’ demand
constant reinvention of the self along with imagined potential requirements.
Deemphasizing education or traditional career progression in terms of enclosed
career stages and highlighting flexibility and the continuous need to adapt to
changing requirements instead, post-disciplinary modes of subjectification call for
the continuous modulation of the self rather than a molding of selves towards more
or less stable models (Weiskopf and Munro 2012).
The concept of the technologies of modulation is based on a Foucauldian
understanding of governance, or better governmentality (see Ezzamel and Reed
2008 for a review of different understandings of governance). Governance
understood in the sense of governmentality is ‘a form of power referring to the
‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault 1980, p. 221)’ (cited in Du Gay 1996, p. 55) that is
‘intimately concerned with ‘‘subjectification’’’ (ibid). Put differently, governmen-
tality is an attempt to shape the field of possible actions (e.g. Dean 2010) and of
possible ways of being. From a governmentality perspective, rationalities of power,
as for example the ‘post-disciplinary’ or ‘projects-oriented justificatory’ regime
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) associated with the network form of organization
12 Weiskopf and Loacker also point to competition and rivalry, and flexibility as further technologies of
modulation.
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‘involve the construction of specific ways for people to be’ (Du Gay 1996, p. 55).
Technologies of modulation in turn permit to trace the processes of subject
formation through which subjects take on these ways of being and highlight the
forcefulness of such processes. It is through this understanding of ‘governance’ as
governmentality that we can see how actors and network organizations are
constituted through social practices and how this very process of constitution is
what governs (network) organizations and their actors. I will explain the single
technologies of modulation (responsibilisation, contractualisation and employabil-
ity) on the example of the case study.
3 Methodology
Understanding how phenomena is constituted in social practices necessitates to ‘get
close’ (Rasche and Chia 2009). Consequently and in line with the suggestions made
by practice-based scholars (e.g. Schatzki 2008, 2012; Nicolini 2009, 2012) an
ethnographic participant observation was conducted within the framework of a case
study. The participant observation was carried out in company ‘X’, an organization
which describes itself both internally and externally as a ‘network organization’.
The selection of the case followed the idea of theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt
1989), aiming at choosing what has been called an exemplary or key case (Thomas
2011). Since the ‘keyness’ of the research subject lies in its ‘capacity to exemplify
the analytical object of the inquiry’ (Thomas 2011, p. 541), an organization which is
described by its members as network organization was chosen. While this argument
about the selection of the case may sound weak from an essentialist point of view,
arguing that ‘properties’ or ‘characteristics’ of the organization should be presented
as proof qualifying this entity as network organization, giving such ‘proof’ would be
against the assumption ground of practice-based studies. Seeing organizations
‘through the practice lens’ (Orlikowski 2000) urges to focus on the emergence of
such phenomena rather than on their presumable properties. From this perspective
‘organizations have neither nature nor essence; they are what people perceive them
to be’ (Czarniawska-Joerges 1993, p. 9). Members of company X (henceforth:
‘Xler’) frequently contrasted ‘their’ way of organizing, working and being to the
ways in which their customers (mostly medium-sized, well-established German
companies) operated—sometimes they also referred to their previous employers to
distinguish their company and themselves from other organizations and their
members. In this context, they regularly portrayed these other companies as ‘rigid’,
‘bureaucratic’, ‘ineffective’, ‘hierarchical’ and ‘rule-governed’ while describing
company X as being more or less the opposite and best described as network-like.
By being network-like, members of this organization usually meant as little formal
rules as possible, as little authoritative behavior and hierarchy as possible and an
emphasis on flexibility, and individual ‘freedom’ and ‘responsibility’. During the
research process it turned out that the value of this case may not lie in its ‘capacity
to exemplify the analytical object of the inquiry’ (Thomas 2011, p. 541), but rather
in its capacity to ‘falsify’ the assumption that trust is the main coordination
mechanism in network organizations. As Flyvbjerg (2006) points out drawing on
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Popper’s (1959) ‘black swan’ example: ‘The case study is well suited for identifying
‘‘black swans’’ because of its in-depth approach: What appears to be ‘‘white’’ often
turns out on a closer examination to be ‘‘black’’’(p. 228).
Founded in 1996 as a spin-off of a research institute, the fast-growing German-
based consulting company today employs more than 2500 people and achieved an
annual turnover of more than a quarter billion in 2013. It provides consulting
services in 11 countries, mainly in the automotive, mobile communications and
aviation sectors. The respective subsidiaries of company X (divided either by
country or sector) were often said to be more or ‘less X-like’, meaning more or less
‘network-like’. I conducted the participant observation as part-time employee over a
period of 7 months in subsidiary ‘A’ of company X. Subsidiary A was not
considered to be very ‘network-like’ by the members of company X (though
possibly still more ‘network-like’ than other companies). However, this subsidiary
cooperated very closely with subsidiary ‘B’ which was regularly cited as being very
‘network-like’. The two subsidiaries were in the same building, used the same
rooms for breaks and work, had the same customers, cooperated in numerous
projects and one of the directors of subsidiary B was also director of subsidiary A.
This setting facilitated a comparison of how working and being in a ‘network’
organization should or should not be according to its members. While B was
financially successful and had a good reputation in company X, this was not the case
for subsidiary A.
The participant observation enabled to ‘get close’ (Rasche and Chia 2009) and
beyond a ‘weak approach’ (Nicolini 2012) to practices (see also Schatzki 2008,
2012). During the participant observation (in total more than 530 h in 68 days
spread over 7 months), fieldnotes were taken (in total 30 pages of single spaced,
typed text) and informal interviews conducted. The participant observation included
working at the company, participating at company events, assessment centers and
leisure time activities (e.g. lunch breaks, cigarette breaks, going out for dinner,
coffee or drinks, visiting the Christmas market, playing billiards). Members of the
organization were informed about the study. In fact, writing a doctoral thesis on
network organizations was listed as main job description in my employment
contract with company X (for which I was allowed to spend 70 per cent of my
working time). Thus, whenever I met new people at company X, I talked to them
about the study (understanding how network organizations work on the example of
company X) when explaining what I did at company X. Additionally, three semi-
structured interviews (one with an employee of subsidiary A, two with members of
subsidiary B), each lasting between one and 2 h were carried out to complement the
impressions gained during the participant observation. The interviews were fully
transcribed verbatim and coded with in vivo and constructed codes using the
software ATLAS.ti (version 7.5.7). While the interviews were helpful for checking
on the experiences made during the participant observation and crucial for making
some of the emergent themes more explicit thus also augmenting my reflection on
these matters, the direct experiences gathered by working in this company,
participating at company functions, and meeting some of the company’s members in
recreational time (as was common in this company) are indubitably at the core of
the empirical base of this study. What Nicolini (2009) remarked regarding a specific
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interview technique holds true for the application of interviews in practice-based
studies more generally: Interviews should be seen as an ‘addition to the toolbox of
ethnographic participant observation’ rather than as ‘a shortcut for doing away with
it’ (p. 199).
The analysis was an iterative process going back and forth between theory, field
and empirical material. Since ‘empirical material never exists outside perspectives
and interpretative repertoires’ (Alvesson and Ka¨rreman 2007, p. 1266), I followed
van Maanen, Sorensen and Mitchell’s (2007) suggestion and tried to give primacy to
both theory and evidence during the analysis. Thus, rather than following a strictly
deductive or inductive logic, I (inevitably) framed the experiences gained during the
participant observation with theoretical concepts and ideas I was already familiar
with (as for example ideas on network organizations) and tried to adopt and
augment a reflexive stance towards these ideas (for example concerning the role of
trust in such organizations) and my expectations about the empirical setting (which
were at the beginning rather positive) and my interpretations of the experiences
made during the participant observation (that have been quite ambivalent). The aim
of the analysis is to provide deep insights into the constitution of this specific
‘network organization’ by focusing on the organization of working and related
integrative practices in company X, pointing to the possible ways of being opened
up by these practices, and carving out the various mechanisms involved in the
processes of subject formation. The analysis is therefore structured around the main
theoretical themes and concepts discussed above.
4 Analysis
4.1 Formal rules and regulations
Striking but rather unsurprising about the way work was organized in company X
was the explicit avoidance of formal rules and regulations. In company X, rules
were associated with bureaucracy (which was perceived as inefficient, useless and
rigid) and thus perceived as inept for a network organization. This finding is in line
with the widespread assertion that network organizations differ from more
bureaucratic organizations by their little use of formal rules (see e.g. Bradach and
Eccles 1993). However, referring to formal rules drawn from the institutional
context (e.g. employment protection legislation) was on some occasions not only
seen as inept, but even taken as assault by some of the organizational members. For
example, when student assistants working at company X addressed their right to
holiday entitlement, some of the organizational members felt that this claim was
very ‘ingrate’, because, from their point of view, student assistants at company X
already had so many benefits (e.g. good wages, flexible working hours, social
events, etc.) which were seen as more than compensating legal or other formal
rights. According to one of the interviewees, some Xler took such claims personal
and reacted quite defensively (i.e. asked student assistants to refrain from making
such claims or leave the company). Other occurrences at company X also made
clear that referring to formal rules and regulations was only acceptable when a third
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party involved demanded certain formal procedures. Otherwise formal rules could
not be referred to—referring to rules was simply not an option for a competent Xler
and, as will be shown shortly, run counter to their understanding of desirable ways
of being.
4.2 Being a competent Xler and the technology of responsibilisation
In company X it was understood that a competent Xler does not need formal rules
(e.g. employment protection legislation) to take care of him-/herself. A competent
Xler is self-reliant. A successful, self-employed entrepreneur enthusiastic about
working at company X. Becoming such a successful Xler was the main telos, the
main aim, of working at company X13 and largely organized the practices
participants’ actions. Besides leading to an avoidance of formal rules and
regulations, this telos organized work activities in various ways: How work was
accomplished was irrelevant, what counted were results; Xler were responsible for
their career; a call for leadership/guidance was considered inept. Generally
speaking, Xler were assumed to be responsible for their own (private and
professional) fate for they had the privilege to make use of the ‘freedom’ provided
by the ‘playground’ (Spielwiese) that company X offered—on the condition that
they acted ‘as if it (company X) was their company’. This emphasis on freedom and
self-responsibility exemplifies what Weiskopf and Loacker (2006) term technology
of responsibilisation. As one of the technologies of modulation which produce ‘the
flexible and governable subject demanded by the post-disciplinary regime’ (ibid,
p. 14), responsibilisation ‘creates individual units that are responsible for carrying
out a task and reaching predefined goals’ (ibid, p. 15).14 While some Xler did see
this freedom to control one’s self (in a predefined way) as privilege, most were
aware that ‘this isn’t something for everybody’. Some stated that they felt left alone
and would appreciate some guidance or somebody who ‘cares’.
4.3 Affectivities of proud and fear
However, taking pride in being a self-reliant and successful Xler was the
appropriate affectivity to be espoused in company X. Thus, Xler were (supposed
to be) constantly in a good temper (as they were seen as responsible for their fate,
being in a bad temper might signal some kind of personal failure, or worse mean
that they actually do not fit to company X). At the beginning of the participant
observation was an instance in which I was asked how I was and answered not so
well. The consternated face of my interlocutor made me aware that this had been a
faux pas. From then on I paid extra attention to espoused affectivities and it became
clear that not being in a good temper was only allowed behind closed doors in the
‘backstage’ regions (Goffman 1959) of company X. Thus, by largely inhibiting the
13 It seems that this was the case for all subject positions, including subject positions that were actually
quite far from this ideal like the student assistants, the ‘girls from the marketing department’ and the
people working at the ‘backoffice’.
14 This emphasis on self-control also resonates with Baecker’s (2001) ‘indirect control’, which he
constructs as a form of ‘management by ties’.
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exhibition of negative affectivities in the public spaces of company X, the
affectivity of proud impeded possibilities to openly voice critique about company X.
I only came across one (!) story about an instance of openly voiced critique in
subsidiary B during the participant observation. This story was about an Xler who
had written ‘unfriendly’ mails and was labeled a ‘virus’ who ‘infects the others—
especially the neophytes’ by the Xler who told me this story. I was not told what
exactly the content of these ‘unfriendly’ mails were or whether the claims this
person made were justified or not. I was only told that the ‘virus’ had left the
company after an interlocution with one of the founders that had ‘not been
unanimous’.
Since voicing critique about company X openly was inhibited by the affectivity
of proud (to be displayed), it was usually ‘behind closed doors’ where the negative
aspects of the telos of self-reliance and self-responsibility were discussed. This telos
was also manifest in subsidiary A, despite the fact that subsidiary A was considered
to be less X-like. Here, the ideal of a competent Xler became most problematic and
other affectivities governing practices participants’ actions came to light. Subsidiary
A was considered to be less X-like especially because of the autocratic and
paternalistic leadership style of its team leader (called ‘Papa’ by employees of the
subsidiary). In this context the discourse of being ‘free’ and the sole person
responsible for one’s fate had little room for materialization. Rather, employees
often felt suppressed and treated unfair. One of the interviewees stated that what
structured her everyday activities in this subsidiary was the constant fear of being
fired. This fear was shared by others at the subsidiary and from my experience
working at this subsidiary, it seemed justified. The affectivity of fear (of being fired)
did indeed structure a great deal of everyday activities. Employees in this subsidiary
came to work when they were ill, executed projects in ways the team leader judged
right but they strongly perceived as wrong, worked long hours and always worried
about how to legitimize their work.15 To reduce this conformity of members of
subsidiary A with what they felt was expected of them to material concerns (e.g.
worries about their economic independence) would ignore the ‘symbolic’ aspects
(Collinson 2003) of such insecurities. The fear of being fired involved much more
than a fear about losing one’s monthly income. Given that members of subsidiary A
also strived for becoming competent Xler,16 the fear of being fired involved an
existential fear about not being able to achieve this goal. Connected to this, such
worries also extended to a projected future in which they saw their employability (a
point to be taken up shortly) in general at risk.
15 Complaining about the behavior of another Xler at a higher hierarchical level was, however,
impossible. Not because there was no higher hierarchical level (as some might expect in network
organizations), but because it was -again- simply not an option a competent Xler would take.
16 Since members of subsidiary B usually blamed their group leader for the negative aspects of their
working lives, becoming a competent Xler could be sensibly constructed as a desirable goal despite the
quite negative feelings members of subsidiary B had about their working lives.
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4.4 The telos of generating revenue
Besides the fear of being fired (subsidiary A) and in line with the aim of becoming a
competent Xler (subsidiary A and B), generating revenue for company X by selling
one’s consulting services to external customers was an important telos structuring
work-related activities in company X. In case of subsidiary B those customers were
usually medium-sized companies of the German automobile sector and customer
relations were long-term oriented. The aims of the company (owners) and (other) Xler
converge in that both subject positions aimed at generating revenue by selling
‘manpower’ to these customers. Thus, generating revenue was another important
telos structuring working and being at this company. Typically, Xler were self-
employed and usually they had cooperation agreements with company X only.17
Every year, Xler negotiated target agreements with their ‘mentor’ specifying how
much revenue should be generated next year, what the next steps will be (for example:
write your first offer, sell so and so many ‘man-hours’ next year) and what they will do
concerning ‘special topics’ (mainly participating at or organizing internal projects or
events). Only aims were defined in such target agreements. How these aims were to be
achieved remained open and under responsibility of the individual Xler. Achieving
the target revenue was, as I was also told in the interviews, a very important goal.
Since customers also paid well for the execution of relatively simple tasks such
as filling in Excel sheets with given data or crafting PowerPoints for presentations
already designed (‘Folien malen’), achieving the target revenue was also possible
for entrants who just finished their university degree. During their first days working
at company X, entrants were usually send to their first ‘Nasentermin’, a meeting
with the customer in which the customer could agree or disagree with the
‘consultant’ presented to him/her for the execution of an order already signed or to
be signed shortly. While the ‘projects’ to be executed were relatively simple, the
situation required persons with a certain appearance and the social skills necessary
to work for the customer (e.g. good self-presentation, communication skills). This
explains why being presentable to a customer was one of the main criteria for HR
selection (besides being congenial and ‘intelligent’) and why professional expertise
was less important in this process.
4.5 Working and employability
The telos of generating revenue structured what was considered appropriate work for a
Xler. Though working in a rather unpretentious project was considered appropriate as
long as sufficient revenue was generated, presenting this project as demanding was
important for various reasons and different subject positions. Since Xler, including the
entrants, aimed at becoming competent Xler, they needed to gain relevant capabilities.
Such capabilities were gained and demonstrated through the projects in which one
worked and recorded in a consultant profile (‘Beratersteckbrief’). The consultant
17 Again, formal rules were avoided, because being such a ‘self-employed employee’ entails dispensing
employee protection rights (which are comparatively extensive in Germany) and not contributing to or
benefiting from social insurance. There may be some issues with the German Labor Law concerning this
matter (Scheinselbsta¨ndigkeit).
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profile, presented to customers searching for some service, is a materialization of what
Weiskopf and Loacker (2006) term technology of ‘employability’, another technology
of modulation producing the governable subject in post-disciplinary regimes. As the
authors point out, the technology of employability has a double effect. First, it creates
‘new fields of visibility’ which introduce ‘objectifying effects’ (ibid, p. 16), i.e. rather
than emphasizing education or traditional career progression in terms of enclosed
career stages, consultant profiles highlighted project experience and competences
(‘methods’). Second, employability reframes the comparatively high uncertainty
accompanying short-term engagements as a challenge—one may even say as an
opportunity—rather than a threat (ibid, p.16). Since becoming a successful Xler
entailed having demonstrated certain competences (e.g. having implemented a process
optimization during a project using the ‘method’ Six Sigma), working in projects rather
than long-term engagements was understood as opportunity for increasing one’s
employability rapidly. Projects conducted were recorded in one’s consultant profile,
materializing one’s employability. However, one can never be ‘employable enough’
(Cremin 2010) in the post-disciplinary regime of work. Since employability is always
concerned with beliefs about possible but fundamentally uncertain future require-
ments, the pursuit of maintaining or increasing one’s employability never ends (see
also Weiskopf and Munro 2012). There is no definite or defined set of capabilities that
makes one a competent Xler and employability is no reachable end state. Further,
capabilities as for example being able to conduct a process optimization using the
‘method’ Six Sigma which are valued today may lose their attractiveness once a
‘better’ or simply more fashionable method appears. The same holds true for the
products, branches and techniques one specialized in. Xler were encouraged to find
new projects for themselves (‘just do what you fancy! Who prevents you from doing
so? Just do it!’) and expected to take responsibility for the routes they chose. The image
of the ideal type worker here is, if still present, flexible and not stable. The same holds
true at the organizational level: As leading figures of company X as for example one of
the founders emphasized in their speeches at company events, the overall company
strategy was to have no strategy. Having a strategy was seen as mistake, because, so the
argument runs, a strategy makes you inflexible to unforeseeable future requirements.
As an HR responsible of subsidiary B put it:
It is possible that we may be doing completely different things tomorrow…we
also always only say when we say what does company X do? Today we do
this. What we will do tomorrow? No clue. (…) We want to invent. We
continuously reinvent ourselves. We try things. Much of this doesn’t work out,
some of this stays.
This ‘strategy of non-strategy’ forecloses any possibility for the development of a
stable image of an ideal type worker and Xler were expected to be thrilled about the
‘opportunities’ offered by company X which demanded constant reinvention of
itself and consequently also of its members. Uncertainties accompanying such
constant reinvention are veiled under the positively connoted mantra of flexibility
(Weiskopf and Loacker 2006).
Somewhat paradoxical about this never-ending quest for employability and the
telos of generating revenue is that clients expect consultants already experienced in
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a certain domain while consultants usually aim at furthering their repertoire of
capabilities. This is especially the case for entrants who, due to their early career
stage, do not dispose of a wide range of project experience. Thus, to boost one’s
reputation as competent Xler and one’s consultant profile, simple tasks (‘projects’)
were presented as more complex and demanding. Since the partners and other Xler
who had acquired the projects needed Xler to carry such projects out (they gained a
commission), they also presented rather undemanding tasks in an attractive way. It
was understood that claims about the complexity of one’s projects were not
responded to by critical questions, but rather used as occasion for presenting one’s
own project in a favorable way. During the participant observation, I regularly
listened to such presentations (in form of informal talks between the colleagues) on
Fridays when the consultants ‘came in’ (consultants often worked at the customers’
office from Monday till Thursday) and I admit that I was impressed by the
presumable complexity of the projects even entrants carried out. I wondered how
these people managed to execute such projects when they just came from university
and did not have any noteworthy practical experience. It took me a while and a lot
of conversations (including the interviews) to realize that projects were usually far
less complex or demanding than they were presented.
4.6 Grounding neophytes and goal-orientation
Though presenting one’s work and self in such a way was generally considered
appropriate, there were limits to how far one could go—and in the end the aim was
not to appear as successful Xler but to become a successful Xler. One of the HR
managers complained that as soon as entrants started working for company X, ‘they
at one go feel like they are something special. Just because they signed here…but
the fact that you now own three suits and ordered caviar doesn’t make you a hero’.
To ‘ground’ the entrants and to show them ‘what they can’t yet do’ or that they
‘can’t anything, but that this isn’t so bad, because that’s why they’re here’, entrants
were send to a ‘bootcamp’ organized by the company after having worked for
approximately 6 months at company X. This 4 days bootcamp was located in a
shutdown ore mine. The location was selected deliberately to ‘ground’ the
participants (one big room with two cold showers, two toilets and three sinks where
all 25–30 participants sleep on mattresses) and sharply contrasted with the luxurious
hotels the consultants were used to in their daily working lives. In the bootcamp,
participants were divided in three groups and each group was given the task to
prepare a presentation on a defined topic to be evaluated by one of the founders (the
one that appeared to be the most ‘legendary’ and charismatic)18 at the last day.
Besides ‘grounding’ the participants, another major aim of the bootcamp was to
show them how to work and what goal-oriented working means in company X.
Pressure was deliberately executed by two charts (see Fig. 1), fortified by the
pending presentation to the founder and, as I was told in the interviews, made even
worse by colleagues (who, as I was told by one of the organizers, ‘mauled’ each
18 Though the company was actually founded by three persons, this founder was at times referred to as
the founder.
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other after a while). After the presentation had been hold and the winner chosen,
participants were encouraged to reflect on their experience at the workshop. In
group discussions led by the organizers of the bootcamp, they came to the
conclusion that all the pressure they experienced was in fact self-induced. As one of
the organizers put it, the bootcamp has something ‘mind-augmenting’ and people
notice that the ‘performance pressure is not extrinsic, but intrinsic and that’s how
you see that you can put yourself under pressure and that you can make yourself
incapable of action’. Because, in the end what counts is the presentation to the
founder. All the rest (e.g. the charts) should be recognized as irrelevant. For
example: worrying about scoring well at the chart on the left (see Fig. 1) is the
wrong goal and only leads to unnecessary and distracting (‘self-induced’) pressure.
The only thing that counts is the final presentation to the founder. Transferred to the
usual work-setting: The only thing that counts is the final service provided to the
customer.
4.7 Forms of employment and contractualisation
Structuring work by goal-orientation has been associated with the technology of
contractualisation (Du Gay 1996), another technology of modulation (Weiskopf and
Loacker 2006) which ‘enterprises up’ institutions or individuals. The technology of
Fig. 1 Charts used at the bootcamp to depict the progress of the three groups. This figure was drawn by
one of the bootcamp organizers. I rewrote the labels for reasons of readability and anonymized the name
of the founder. The label of the axes of the chart on the left show progress in time as judged by the
bootcamp organizers. The vertical axes which indicates the progress was deliberately left undefined by
the organizers of the bootcamp. The lines represent the respective progress of the three groups. The bar
chart on the right depicts the time already passed and still left until the presentation to the founder
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contractualisation consists in contractualising relationships (in the case of company
X mainly traditional employment relationships) in such a way that a distinct
performance is assigned to a specific unit (in this case the carrying out of a specific
project to an individual Xler) who is then responsible for the carrying out and
outcome of this assignment (Du Gay 1996). Literal contractualisation of the
employment relationship in terms of self-employment was the norm and considered
appropriate for a successful Xler. I regularly heard the claim that one needs to be
self-employed to ‘be on par’ with one’s superiors and the partners. This talk about
‘being on par’ with ones superiors and partners resonates the discourse of the
‘projects-oriented justificatory regime’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) in which
hierarchy is rejected as a form of domination (p. 165). In line with the telos of
becoming a successful Xler and the associated emphasis on self-reliance, being told
what to do by another person was considered wrong. A competent Xler should be
capable of making his or her own decisions. One of the interviewees compared
having a superior with being a dog on the leash of his master. He preferred to put
himself on the leash. Being self-employed was considered to enable Xler to do so
and was thus the expected option to take in company X.
However, there were also some exceptions. While work relationships have been
literally contractualised in the case of the ‘self-employed employees’, some Xler
had regular employment contracts. But since employment contracts were also
categorized as formal rules and regulations and thus considered inept for a network
organization like company X, referring to such contracts was seen as unacceptable.
Thus, a ‘reconstruction of social relations (…) in terms of ‘‘contract’’’ (Weiskopf
and Loacker 2006, p. 15) was also possible (and present) even if an Xler had a
traditional employment contract. It seems that continuous performance measure-
ment, another feature of the technology of contractualisation (Weiskopf and
Loacker 2006), was even more present in these cases. In subsidiary A for example,
which was considered less network-like, most of the employees had regular
employment contracts. Still it was expected that employees ‘pay off’. Here, the team
leader was responsible for acquiring and allocating projects and the employees were
responsible for carrying these projects out. As in subsidiary B, turnover was
generated mostly through ‘external projects’, i.e. consulting services provided to
external customers. Contrary to subsidiary B, employees seldom had direct
customer contact. Instead, the team leader judged the quality of a service (usually a
PowerPoint presentation) before the customer did. One of the teloi of working in
subsidiary A was thus to deliver results that were likely to be judged positively by
the team leader (and later by the customer). In combination with the affectivity of
fear of being fired which structured the working practices in this subsidiary, any task
or project was perceived as a test. This state of permanent performance evaluation
was perceived as highly stressful by the employees of subsidiary A, especially
because the projects were usually ill-defined and the evaluation criteria opaque and
alternating. For example, I was asked to make a short version of a presentation on a
change management tool to be included in some presentation of the range of
services of subsidiary A which the team leader had doomed to be completely useless
and ‘crap’ some weeks earlier.
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4.8 Trust-based working hours
Working goal-oriented in subsidiary A basically meant being responsible for
achieving an unknown and changing goal, usually under time-pressure (one of the
team leader’s favorite slogans was ‘diamonds are formed by high pressure’). How
much time was spent for achieving this goal was largely irrelevant (this was also the
case in subsidiary B)—as long as the deadline was met. Working hours were not
recorded or reported. The absence of an attendance recorder or the like and the use
of so-called trust-based working hours (Arbeit auf Vertrauensbasis) was presented
in a positive light by the team leader and others. We will not control how much you
work, so the argument goes, because we trust you. In practice, employees of
subsidiary A worked way more than the 8 h specified in their employment contracts.
Working ten to 12 h a day (on average) was not uncommon for some of the
employees and, though they felt it was weird, some said to feel bad if they had not
made ‘so much’ overtime in a certain time-span. Again, employees are free to lead
themselves as long as they act in the interest of the company (technology of
responsibilisation) and achieve a pre-specified goal (technology of contractualisa-
tion), i.e. ‘pay off’. The drawbacks accompanied by responsibilisation and
contractualisation are hidden under the positively connoted veil of trust.
4.9 Related integrative practices
Contractualisation and responsibilisation redefine the subject positions available in
working practices and shift risk and responsibility from the employer to the
‘employee’—or better to the ‘entrepreneur’. Simultaneously taking on this
responsibility and risk makes Xler entrepreneurial selves actively seeking to
increase their employability through their engagement in projects. This raises the
question why Xler would stay at company X when they became successful
entrepreneurs (a question also addressed by the charismatic founder in his speech at
one of the company events). One possible answer to this question is that being a
Xler was not limited to being a participant of the integrative working practices at
company X,19 but also entailed being a ‘cool’ and ‘fun’ person. Partying was central
to this company and employees regularly aimed at being the ‘jester number one’
(‘Spaßmacher Nummer 1’) at company events and other occasions. As several Xler
told me and as I noticed during one of the assessment centers, ‘would I like to have a
beer with this person’ was one of the three questions decisive for the outcome of the
recruitment process (the others being: does this person make company X more
‘intelligent’ and can she/he be send to the customer tomorrow). The importance of
partying and drinking alcohol together was highlighted by virtually everybody in
this company I talked to during the participant observation and in the interviews.
‘Work hard, play hard’ was a slogan.
19 Apart from that, increasing one’s employability is a never-ending task and company X usually always
had projects. Further, and in contrast to other consultancies, there was no ‘up or out’ mentality. The
network discourse allowed to imagine vertical growth instead of horizontal, hierarchical growth in which
the top gets always thinner, leaving room for a few people only.
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As Costas (2012) points out in her exploration of the ‘friendship culture’ in a
management consultancy, such a strong incorporation of traditionally non-work
related practices associated with leisure time into the realms of the company can
lead to a stronger ‘integration of the overall employee self’ (p. 393). Though
traditionally non-work related practices such as partying and drinking alcohol
together have conventionally been approached as ‘forms of subversion, resistance,
and escape’ (Costas 2012, p. 393), such practices can actually be interwoven with
and stabilize the nexus of practices productive of organizations and their members.
The main telos of partying and drinking alcohol together at company X was to fulfill
the expectations about being good at socializing or ‘networking’. Partying was also
very often used to present one’s self and to leave a lasting impression. Indeed,
stories about drunken men (all the stories I heard featured men in the star role) who
did something which was considered to be funny were told quite frequently and in
admiring voices in the company setting. The names of these persons were known
widely afterwards in company X. One such story that I heard several times during
the participant observation and then again in the interviews was about an Xler who
belonged to the group of the ‘important people’. This Xler was very drunk at an
inauguration party of a new office building and partied so hard that he wrecked the
new building. To my surprise (I had only been working at company X for some
weeks), this was perceived as very cool and funny. Pictures of the demolished
rooms were sent to colleagues who were not present at the inauguration party and
then shown to each other at the other offices. It were such stories, but also other
occurrences which made it clear for everybody: If you cannot party and (are not
willing to) drink, you are out (this was also stated explicitly several times). Another
occurrence at a ‘Methods Slam’ organized by company X also exemplifies the
importance of being a good party person: The one who won the ‘Methods Slam’ (he
received a trophy) was the one who was the most drunk (which was highlighted and
celebrated again at the plenary meeting the next day).
When partying, Xler aimed at socializing and leaving an impression. It seems
plausible that this aim was shared by the (owners of the) company. One of the
owners stated at a company event that the owners do not see such events as a cost,
but rather as an investment and as a gratification for the work of the Xler. For sure
there was an interest in stimulating exchange and creating a bond between Xler.
Connected to this, there was another story circulating about the reason for
conducting these luxury events which goes beyond the immediate slice of
integrative practices of the company to the more private spheres of the people
associated with the company. It was said that the company events originated in the
wish to show one’s family and friends why one spends so much time at company X.
Thus, an Xler was always invited to bring their partner or some friend(s) to these
company events to show them how ‘cool’ company X is and how much fun it is to
be there. While this also encouraged Xler to recruit their own families and friends
(which happened quite frequently), it underscores the affectivity of proud about
working at company X that Xler were expected to feel and display.
Beyond trust: towards a practice-based understanding of…
123
5 Discussion
Considering the foregoing analysis, it is plausible to question the centrality of trust
as coordinating mechanism specific to and characteristic of ‘network organizations’.
In the network organization analyzed, the idea of trust was explicitly used to replace
more traditional forms of control in case of the ‘trust-based working time’. Here, the
positively connoted idea of trust veiled the drawbacks (e.g. working longer hours
than specified in employment contracts) of post-disciplinary regimes of work.
Besides this, trust was not a central theme in company X. It thus seems that trust
rather belongs to the ‘grammar’ of the ‘projects-oriented justificatory regime’
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) and is perpetuated in managerial literature than
being the central mechanism specific to and characteristic of ‘network
organizations’.
Starting from practices rather than actors or their (presumably trustful) relations,
the analysis demonstrated that a multiplicity of mechanisms contribute to the
constitution of company X and its members, suggesting that this very process of
constitution is a governmental process.20 Specifically, it has been demonstrated how
technologies of modulation (Weiskopf and Loacker 2006) such as contractualisation
and responsibilisation redefine the subject positions traditionally made available in
working practices and shift risk and responsibility from the employer to the
‘employee’—or better to the ‘entrepreneur’. Simultaneously taking on this
responsibility and risk makes Xler entrepreneurs, always striving to fulfill the
Sisyphean undertaking of continuously increasing their employability through their
engagement in projects. The analysis thus illustrated a shift in the mode of
organizational subjectification in post-disciplinary regimes of work (Weiskopf and
Munro 2012): In contrast to disciplinary modes of subjectification where employees
could proceed in preset career stages towards some more or less stable image of an
ideal type worker, post-disciplinary regimes demand constant reinvention of the self
along with imagined potential requirements. Deemphasizing education or traditional
career progression in terms of enclosed career stages and highlighting flexibility and
the continuous need to adapt to changing requirements instead, calls for the
continuous modulation of the self (post-disciplinary mode of organizational
subjectification) rather than a ‘molding’ of employees towards more or less
stable models of ‘ideal workers’ (disciplinary mode of organizational subjectifica-
tion) (Weiskopf and Munro 2012). In company X, this shift in the mode of
subjectification somewhat built on a shift in the employer–employee relationship:
By taking on the responsibility that contractualisation postulated, Xler affirmed the
entrepreneurial identity that engages in the never-ending quest for employability
(see also du Gay1996, p. 180). Contractualised relationships differ from traditional
employment contracts where tasks to be performed are specified, but where
employees are not responsible for the economic reasonability of the outcome of
20 Approaching governance in network organizations from a practice-based perspective does not
foreclose the possibility of trustful relationships between the members of an organization. Analytically,
trust as a type of expectation or belief could for example also be approached as a ‘cognitive or intellectual
life condition’ (Zustand) (Schatzki 2008, pp. 37–38) in empirical cases were trust seems more
consequential than in company X.
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these tasks. Through taking on the responsibility for the execution and outcome of a
project, Xler affirmed an entrepreneurial identity and thusly also contributed to the
telos of the integrative working practice of becoming a successful Xler.
Moreover, the analysis highlighted the role of understandings, rules and
teleoaffective structures in organizing integrative practices and structuring the
practices participants’ actions. In case of company X, the teloi of becoming a
successful Xler and of generating revenue were quite influential in structuring
Xlers’ actions. These aims inhibited reference to formal rules and regulations (telos
of becoming a competent Xler), structured what was considered appropriate work
for an Xler (telos of generating revenue) and the manner in which this work was to
be carried out (telos of becoming a competent Xler). Affectivities of proud and fear
also played a central role in structuring the participants’ actions. Both affectivities
worked against possible forms of resistance, thereby stabilizing the nexus of
practices. While the affectivity of fear induced conformity through insecurities
about existential material and symbolic concerns, the affectivity of proud largely
inhibited the exhibition of negative affectivities in the public spaces of company X,
making overt critique hardly possible for competent Xler or Xler aiming to become
recognized as such. Apart from that, the analysis has shown how traditionally non-
work related practices such as partying and drinking alcohol together which have
conventionally been approached as ‘forms of subversion, resistance, and escape’
(Costas 2012, p. 393) can actually be interwoven with and stabilize the nexus of
practices productive of organizations and their members.
6 Conclusion
Contrary to the widely shared assertion in the literature on network organizations
and organizational networks, this paper argued that trust may not be the central
coordination mechanism specific to and characteristic of ‘network organizations’.
To contribute to a more differentiated understanding of the coordination of everyday
activities in such organizations in order to enhance our understanding of the
constitution of this way of organizing, this paper developed a practice-based
understanding of governing ‘network organizations’ and gave deep insights into the
complexity of mechanisms involved in the constitution of a specific network
organization. In the specific case analyzed, trust played a rather marginal role in
structuring practices participants’ actions. Trust was explicitly used to replace more
traditional forms of control in case of the ‘trust-based working time’. Here, the
positively connoted idea of trust veiled the drawbacks (e.g. working longer hours
than specified in employment contracts) of post-disciplinary regimes of work.
Besides this, trust was not a central theme in company X. Overall, my analysis
suggests that trust rather belongs to the ‘grammar’ of the ‘projects-oriented
justificatory regime’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) and is perpetuated in
managerial literature than being the central mechanism specific to and characteristic
of ‘network organizations’.
To finish, I want to draw attention to some of the limitations and implications of
this study and point to some potentially interesting routes yet to be explored.
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Though we may question the central role of trust in network organizations by a
single in-depth case study, it is not possible to generalize on the specific
coordination mechanisms on this basis. For example, the fierce refusal of formal
rules and regulations prevalent in company X might be partly due to the company’s
national context. The German context is marked by an extensive degree of
formalization and this might lead to backlashes which might be less definite in other
cases. Thus, the explanatory power of this study in terms of how specifically
network organizations are governed is limited. Though generalizability has neither
been my aim nor does this aim, in principle, seem achievable for me, I hope that
some of the findings might be transferable to other cases and believe that a
comparison with similar cases could lead to interesting insights into the rationality
of such post-disciplinary regimes of work. As has been shown in this study,
practice-based theories offer one perspective suitable for this undertaking for they
do not presuppose how (network) organizations and their members are or function.
The flexibility that practice-based theories offer for exploring the outcome of
diverse organizing attempts enables to meaningfully investigate assemblages that
might not fall under established conceptual divisions such as intra-/interorganiza-
tional, or employee/organization. For example, in case of company X an employee
was not necessarily classified as such by other Xler according to whether or not he/
she hold an employment contract with company X. ‘Self-employed employees’ only
held cooperation agreements with company X, but were treated and behaved like
employees. On the other hand, a self-employed person in fact formally constitutes
its own enterprise in Germany (and in this sense, company X is an Xler’s customer).
Thus, seen in this light, a ‘self-employed employee’ is both an organization and an
employee. Taken further, company X can in fact be theorized as both an intra- and
interorganizational network. Such cases carry with them a kind of latent ambiguity
and somewhat question the suitability of established distinctions and categories. In
their influential review of the ‘network paradigm in organizational research’,
Borgatti and Foster (2003) point to a ‘linguistic chaos’ in the research area of
network organizations and organizational networks. While this claim is certainly
comprehensible and some more ‘order’ (ibid) most probably desirable, it may very
well be that we need different categories and distinctions to grasp current
developments in attempts of organizing and ways of governing to see clearer.
Further, this study mainly problematized the centrality ascribed to trust as
governance mechanism in the literature on network organizations, but left the
presumed neutrality of ‘trust’ largely unquestioned. However, as this study hinted at
in case of the trust-based working hours, ‘trust’, when explicitly appealed to in
praxis, is itself a form of exercising power. As part of the ‘grammar’ of the
‘projects-oriented justificatory regime’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005), the very
discourse of trust may be used deliberately to veil drawbacks of post-disciplinary
regimes of work. As Skinner et al. put it, ‘the very language of trust may itself
contain within it a sinister potential as deliberately engineered performative acts’ (p.
220). In line with Skinner et al.’s (2014) call for investigating the underexplored use
of the ‘discourse of trust’, I suggest that future studies should focus on empirical
cases of ‘network organizations’ in which this discourse is more consequential, to
help us to see and understand the downsides of this concept—a concept that has
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been perpetuated and left unquestioned for too long in theoretical debates on the
governance of network organizations.
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